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Introduction
That the events of 11 September changed profoundly the world we live in is so obvious as to be hardly worth saying. But the politics of the post 9/11 world is full of contradictions. We now live in a world where western states can openly defend the use of torture and routinely employ detention without trial and, at the same time, claim to be protecting and advancing a liberal agenda of stateness, which leads to a gradual seepage of interest away from some very important prerequisites for democratic development over the long term.
This article is an attempt to open a debate about the way forward. The argument is, in one sense, straightforward: what is required is a creative and constructive engagement between comparative politics, from where early debates emerged, and international studies on the other. A dialogue between the these fields can help build a critical approach, be able to identify the drivers of contemporary democratization and explore what it has come to mean and, at the same time, provide a way to explore some of the core issues, long identified within democratization studies, as the obstacles to democratization. These include questions of stateness, state capacity and governance. Linking them to the 'international', however, means that this paper will be able to explore them in a more holistic fashion than has usually been the case hitherto. At the same time, making explicit the ways in which international concerns now shape political agendas traditionally regarded as 'domestic', will allow us to explore more fully the normative underpinning that lies behind current pro-democracy practices.
The Limits of Democratization Studies
The study of democracy and democratization has undergone considerable change since Seymour Martin Lipset set out the economic and political prerequisites of democracy.
3 Yet, the war in Iraq and the failure of democratization in much of the former Soviet Union reminds us that democratization is a complex process that Guillermo O'Donnell and Thomas Carothers point out does not have an end. 4 Rather, states are more, or less, democratic. The traditional study of democratization largely became a comparative politics study of a one-way process of regime change, from authoritarianism to democracy.
This comparative politics approach to democratization is problematic in both its concentration on agency and domestic political factors. As Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan illustrate, structure is as important a driver of democratization. 5 For example, Linz and Stepan discover that structural elements of the prior regime have an important impact on regime paths and consolidation 'tasks'. 6 To a great extent, these structural elements have an impact on the nature of agency. In this regard, Linz and Stepan find that the "possibilities and limits of [elite] 'pacts'" are largely, although not wholly, determined by the structure of the prior regime. Others such as
Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, illustrate how economic structures determine the opportunities and paths of democratization. democracy. 19 The paper expands on the relationship between state capacity and democratization later in this paper.
As others have said before us, the traditional comparative politics approach simply does not go far enough in explaining democratization. As Petr Kopeckỳ and Cas Mudde argue, the democratization literature has neglected two fundamental dimensions of democratization: the relationship between nation and state-building and the international dimension. 20 More recently, there have been attempts to address these deficiencies from the perspectives of citizenship and globalization studies. As they regard democratization, the two areas of study coincide to stress the role of global civil society as an 'opportunity structure through which to engage in social struggle in order to transform and extend citizenship'. 21 Yet, international politics illustrates that there are other international forces at work in democratization. The paper argues that as much as democratization has been shaped by domestic agents and structures, it has also been shaped by international politics.
In the following section, the paper highlights the need to incorporate the international dimension into democratization studies.
The 'Global' Factor
For many transitologists, the main exogenous factor of democratization was the zeitgeist of liberalization. As stated earlier, democratization studies most often focused on endogenous agency as the drivers of democratization, despite the fact that external actors have been important the impact of specific actors, such as the USA or United Nations, as well as larger processes like globalization on democratization. 26 The war in Iraq has illustrated the importance of exogenous actors and their impact on the democratization process and democratization studies must change to continue to have some explanatory power.
The traditional approach to democratization does not reflect the current events in the world.
The argument laid out here states that democratization studies requires an inter-disciplinary evolution to deal with these corrections in our understanding of democratization. 
The 'Societal' Factor
Iraq illustrates that the assumption democracy can be created by war and international power is proving to be erroneous. The military intervention in Iraq stresses the primacy of the international over the domestic. In this context, the importance of the international dimension means stressing the securitization of democratization, as discussed above. peace theory, there remains the problem in differentiating between regime change in general and democratization specifically.
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In this regard, the familiar complaint is that democracy promotes 'one person, one vote', automatically favouring the largest group assuming (and this is often a big assumption) that individuals rally behind the 'in-group' rather than a non-ethnic political party. Donald Horowitz reminds us that as ethnic competition and thus salience increases, there will be increasing pressure for ordinarily non-ethnic parties to pick sides. 39 Altogether, John Rawls' 'political liberalism' which dictates constitutional neutrality does not lead to a prolonged political settlement within societies divided by sectarianism. 40 To avoid this kind of state-capture, several scholars have suggested methods of reducing tension between sectarian groups within a democracy. Arend Lijphart's consociationalism offers groups 'internal self-determination', but this requires that groups effectively live in separate communities. 41 Even should groups live separate, homogenous communities, there still exist tensions between centralisation and decentralisation. 42 Democratic liberalism, as put forward by Albert Weale, emphasises the need for political participation as a means of promoting compromise through negotiation. While democratic liberalism says much about the political, it says little about society. 43 More specifically, different groups have different capacities for bargaining. Democratic liberalism requires that all participating groups have similar levels of bargaining power, a circumstance unlikely to happen in the real world especially in times 38 David J. Galbreath, 'Democratisation and Inter-State War: Why Reform does not Encourage Conflict', Politics, of transition. However, no form of decision-making procedure will ever be perfect. 'The creative challenge is to devise methods of governance that both condition existing ways of doing things democratically and open the way to their re-evaluation over time'. 44 The more that the state can provide public goods for all, despite group membership and avoid accumulating private goods for one group over another, the greater the chance that the state will remain unchallenged.
If we rely on Rustow's demarcation of liberalization and transition as the first two stages of democratization, we can see that many countries have failed or at least been set considerably back because of the lack of national integrity. The largest group of states that fit this bill are those in the post-Soviet area (arguably excluding the three Baltic States). Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Russian Federation (to name only four) have all had their difficulties in maintaining control over their territory and providing support among all relevant groups for the state. 45 Georgia has had to face the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, neither of which is headed towards a solution especially after the precedent to make Kosovo independent. Ukraine first settled a contentious relationship with the Crimean Tatars, but now seems to be locked into a political struggle between the nationalist west and the pro-Russian east. Moldova experienced a short insurrection in 1992 resulting in the breakaway area of Transdneistria. Russia, an important agitator in these areas, has had its own problems in Chechnya (and to a lesser extent Dagestan and Tatarstan) which has seen a nationalist, separatist movement turn into an 'Islamic jihad' against the Perhaps even more frustrating, many scholars who attempt to address both democracy and security together tend to focus on the latter with scant attention to the former. 50 Yet, despite the progress seen in the regions of the 'third-wave', the lack of security has impaired many states that have made great strides politically and economically. At the same time, the lack of a respect for societal and human security offers a further explanation as to why some states have reverted to autocratic ways or those states who simply never carried forward with democratic reforms in the first place. This underdeveloped, or at least underappreciated, notion of security in democratization studies reflects itself on to democracy promotion. The policies and projects of democracy promotion must also encourage the development of human security as another 'pillar' of democracy. Before Iraq, the US was the only superpower willing to venture across the globe to intervene militarily and politically. Furthermore, the US was the only superpower that could validly claim to be 'spreading democracy' despite the challenges and at times failed logic that followed this policy.
Democracy promotion in the future will again return to the impact of globalization as a politicoeconomic process that has the potential to empower individuals. For democratization studies, this means again turning away from the view that democratization is an elite project. 56 At the same time,
Iraq suggests that it is hard to accept the notion that building democracy is a good faith liberal democracy promotion on the other, this argument recognises an increasing intertwining between state and engineering.
Conclusion
How to address these issues in democratization studies? Clearly there is a need for democratization studies to address these issues since these are the very issues facing democratising countries and policy makers thinking about democracy building. Yet, how to do we do it? This paper invites a more inter-disciplinary approach that is at the same time less theoretically narrow.
Democratization studies can gain greatly from the insights of comparative politics for its concentration on agency, international political economy for its focus on globalization and citizenship, as well as International Relations for its concentration on power, interests and norms in international politics. There is a need now more than ever for scholars from different parts of the political studies community to speak to each other. In so doing, democratization studies also needs to reorganise itself as a creative, genuinely inter-disciplinary endeavour able to analyse cogently and critically contemporary politics at the global and domestic level. Overall, there is a hope in this way to offer a mode of analysis of democratization that avoids endorsing what may be seen as morally indefensible and tantamount to the imposition of Western values and interests through terror and torture.
